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Three of the most important recent facts in global macroeconomics — the sustained rise in the US
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real investments. In extensions of the basic model, we also generate exchange rate and FDI excess returns
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events that motivate our analysis, the framework is ﬂexible enough to shed light on a range of scenarios
in a global equilibrium environment.
JEL Codes: E0, F3, F4, G1
Keywords: Current account deﬁcits, capital ﬂows, interest rates, global portfolios and equilibrium,
growth and ﬁnancial development asymmetries, exchange rates, FDI, intermediation rents.
∗Respectively: MIT and NBER; Harvard; Berkeley and NBER. E-mails: caball@mit.edu, efarhi@harvard.edu,
pog@berkeley.edu. We thank Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Bachetta, Olivier Blanchard, VV Chari, Mike Dooley, Jeﬀ Frankel,
Francesco Giavazzi, Gita Gopinath, Gian Maria Milessi Ferreti, Enrique Mendoza, Michael Mussa, Maury Obstfeld, Fabrizio
Perri, Paolo Pesenti, Richard Portes, Helene Rey,Andrei Shleifer, Lars Svensson, Jaume Ventura, Joachim Voth, Ivan Werning,
and seminar participants at AEA meetings, Berkeley, Brown, BIS’ conference on ﬁnancial globalization, CEPR’s ﬁrst annual
workshop on Global Interdependence, CREI-Ramon Arces conference, ESSIM in Tarragona, Harvard, IMF, MIT, MIT-Central
Banks Network, NBER-EFG, NBER-IFM, Princeton, SCCIE, SED in Vancouver, Stanford, University of Houston and Yale for
their comments. Caballero and Gourinchas thank the NSF for ﬁnancial support. First draft: September 2005.
11 Introduction
Three facts have dominated the discussion in global macroeconomics in recent times:
Fact 1: The US has run a persistent current account deﬁcit since the early 1990s, which has accelerated
dramatically since the late 1990s. By 2004, it exceeded US$600 billions a year. The solid dark line in
Figure 1(a) illustrates this path, as a ratio of World’s GDP (this line also includes the deﬁcits of the U.K.
and Australia, for reasons that will be apparent below, but it is overwhelmingly dominated by the U.S.
pattern). The counterpart of these deﬁcits has been driven by the surpluses in Japan and Continental
Europe throughout the period and, starting at the end of the 1990s, by the large surpluses in Asia ex-Japan,
commodity producers, and the turnaround of the current account deﬁcits in most non-European emerging
market economies.
Fact 2: The long run real interest rate has been steadily declining over the last decade, despite recent eﬀorts
from central banks to raise interest rates – the “Greenspan’s Conundrum”. See Figure 1(b).
Fact 3: The importance of US assets in global portfolios has increased throughout the period and by 2004
it amounted to over 17 percent of the rest of the world’s ﬁnancial wealth, which is equivalent to 43 percent
of their annual output. See Figure 1(c).
Despite extensive debates on the factors behind and the sustainability of this environment, there are very
few formal structures to analyze these joint phenomena. The conventional view and its recent formalizations,
attempt mostly to explain (the ﬁrst half of) fact 1, largely ignore fact 2, and take 3 as an exogenous anomaly.
The analysis about the future then consists of telling the story that follows once this “anomaly” goes away.
However, capital ﬂows are primarily an asset market phenomenon and hence the paths of interest rates and
portfolios must be made an integral part of the analysis if we are to conjecture on what got the world into
the current situation and how it is likely to get out of it.1
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to analyze global equilibrium, and its response
to a variety of relevant shocks and structural changes. As an important side product, the framework also
sheds light on the above facts. The model is designed to highlight the role of global asset-markets and, in
particular, of asset-supply in shaping global capital ﬂows, interest rates and portfolios. We use this model
to show that the dominant features in Figure 1, together with observed exchange rates and gross ﬂows
patterns, can arise naturally from observed ﬁnancial market shocks and structural factors which interact
with heterogeneous degrees of ﬁnancial market development in diﬀerent regions of the world.
In Figure 1(a), we divide the world into four groups: The US (and “similar” economies such as Australia
and the U.K.) (U); the EuroZone (E); Japan (J); and the rest (R). The latter include emerging markets,
oil producing countries, and high saving newly industrialized economies, such as Hong-Kong, Singapore and
Korea. While most of the academic literature has focused on the interaction between U and E, it is apparent
1Recently, some of the debate in policy circles also has began to highlight the role of equilibrium in global capital markets
for US current account deﬁcits. See especially Bernanke (2005) and IMF (2005). We will revisit the “saving glut” view after
we have developed our framework.
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Figure 1: Three Stylized Facts. Sources: (a) WDI and Deutsche Bank. (b) International Financial Statistics and Survey of
Professional Forecasters. (c) World Development Indicators, Bureau of Economic Analysis, European Central Bank, Bank of
Japan and Authors’ calculations (see appendix)
3from the ﬁgure that the most important interaction is that between U and R. Thus, our analysis is about
global equilibrium in a U − R world.2 The key feature of the model is that it focuses on the regions’ ability
to supply ﬁnancial assets to savers. On net, region U supplies assets; region R demands ﬁnancial assets.
Thus, fast growth in R coupled with their inability to generate suﬃcient local store of value instruments
increases their demand for saving instruments from U.
In this world, we investigate the implications of a collapse in asset markets in R, such as that experienced
by emerging markets in the late 1990s, as well as of the gradual integration and emergence of fast growing
R economies, such as China.3 We show that both phenomena point in the same direction, in terms of
generating a rise in capital ﬂows toward U, a decline in real interest rates, and an increase in the importance
of U’s assets in global portfolios. Moreover, while there are natural forces that undo some of the initial trade
deﬁcits in U, these are tenuous, as U’s current account never needs to turn into surplus and capital ﬂows
“indeﬁnitely” toward U.
Although not as important as the recent patterns in R, much of the analysis we conduct also applies
to the high saving rate (and hence high asset demand) of Japan and the aftermath of the collapse in the
Japanese bubble in the early 1990s. Thus we also discuss these features in our analysis, as they help to
explain the milder imbalances observed in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
In the basic model, there is a single good and productive assets are ﬁxed and (implicitly) run by local
agents. We relax these assumptions in extensions. In the ﬁrst one we allow for an investment margin and
a reason for foreign direct investment (FDI). These additions enrich the framework along two important
dimensions in matching the facts: First, the collapse in asset markets in R can lead to an investment slump
in R – as opposed to just an increase in saving rates – which exacerbates the results from the basic model.
Second, the intermediation rents from FDI, whose main reason is to transfer “corporate governance” from
one country to another, reduce the trade surpluses that U needs to generate to repay for its persistent early
deﬁcits. In some instances, these rents allow U to ﬁnance permanent trade deﬁcits.
In the second extension we allow for heterogeneous goods and discuss real exchange rate determination.
The exchange rate patterns generated by the expanded model in response to the shocks highlighted above
are broadly consistent with those observed in the data. In particular, U’s exchange rate appreciates in the
short run, and then (very) gradually depreciates in the absence of further shocks.
As we mentioned above, much of the academic literature has focused on the U −E and (less frequently)
the U − J dimensions. For instance, Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) analyze US external imbalances
2For completeness, in an earlier version of this paper we accounted for the U −E pattern in terms of the growth diﬀerential
between U and E. This diﬀerential not only explains the ﬂows from E to U but also why a disproportionate share of the ﬂows
from R go to U rather than to E. See Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006b).
3See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles in emerging markets as a result of their inability to
generate reliable ﬁnancial assets. When local bubbles crash, countries need to seek stores of value abroad. This pattern could
also arise from a fundamental shock due to a change in public perception of the soundness of the ﬁnancial system and local
conglomerates, degree of “cronysm,” and so on.
4from the point of view of portfolio balance theory ` a la Kouri (1982). Their approach takes world interest
rates as given and focuses on the dual role of the exchange rate in allocating portfolios between imperfectly
substitutable domestic and foreign assets and relative demand through the terms of trade. In their model,
the large recent US current account imbalances result from exogenous increases in U.S. demand for foreign
goods and in foreign demand for U.S. assets. Their model predicts a substantial future depreciation of the US
dollar since the exchange rate is the only equilibrating variable and current account deﬁcits must be reversed.
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) and (2005) consider an adjustment process through the global reallocation of
demand for traded versus non traded and domestic versus foreign goods. Their analysis takes as given that
a current account reversal needs to occur in the US, as well as the levels of relative supply of traded and
non-traded goods in each country. Because the current account deﬁcits represents a large share of traded
output, they too, predict a large real depreciation of the dollar. These papers diﬀer from ours in terms of
the shocks leading to the current “imbalances”, our emphasis on equilibrium in global ﬁnancial markets and,
most importantly, on the connection between this equilibrium and the countries’ ability to produce sound
ﬁnancial assets.
Among the papers focusing on developed economies ﬂows, the closest paper to ours in terms of themes
and some of the implications is Caballero, Farhi and Hammour (2006a), who present several models of
speculative investments booms in U and low global interest rates. One of the mechanisms they discuss is
triggered by a slowdown in investment opportunities in the rest of the world. However the emphasis in that
paper is on the investment side of the problem and ignores the role of R and asset supply, which are central
to our analysis in this paper. Kraay and Ventura (2007) analyze an environment similar to that in Caballero
et al.. Their emphasis is on the allocation of excess global savings to a US bubble but it does not connect
capital ﬂows to growth and domestic ﬁnancial markets fundamentals as we do here. Finally, Cooper (2005)
presents a view about the U − J region similar to ours in terms of substantive conclusions.
For the U − R part, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) and Dooley and Garber (2007) have
argued that the current pattern of US external imbalances does not represent a threat to the global macroe-
conomic environment. Their “Bretton Woods II” analysis states that the structure of capital ﬂows is optimal
from the point of view of developing countries trying to maintain a competitive exchange rate, to develop a
productive traded good sector, or to absorb large amounts of rural workers in the industrial sector. Unlike
theirs, our analysis emphasizes the role of private sector capital ﬂows and argues that the exchange rate is
mostly a sideshow.4
4We do not deny the existence of large reserves accumulation by China and others. Nonetheless, we make three observations.
First, most of these reserves are indirectly held by their local private sectors through (quasi-collateralized) low-return sterilization
bonds in a context with only limited capital account openness. Second, US gross ﬂows are an order of magnitude larger than
oﬃcial ﬂows – rather than imputing Chinese reserves accumulation to ﬁnancing the US current account deﬁcit, one could
equally well (or poorly) argue that they are ﬁnancing FDI ﬂows to emerging markets, including China. Third, the role of oﬃcial
interventions was most important at a time when the US was experiencing a temporary slowdown, while our analysis refers to
more persistent trends.
5Section 2 is the core of the paper and presents the main model and mechanisms. Section 3 supports the
main quantitative claims. Section 4 introduces an investment margin and a reason for FDI, while Section 5
analyzes exchange rate determination. Section 6 concludes and is followed by several appendices.
2 A Model with Explicit Asset Supply Constraints
In this section we develop a stylized model that rationalizes the broad patterns of capital ﬂows, interest
rates and global portfolios shown in Figure 1. The model highlights equilibrium in capital markets and, in
particular, the supply side of the market for global saving instruments. It is apparent from ﬁgure 1(a) that
the dominant part of the story is the interaction between U and R.5
This interaction is the focus of this paper, which we explain in terms of the depressed ﬁnancial markets
conditions in R. Moreover, an important component of the surpluses generated by the J region is due to the
collapse in the Japanese asset bubble in the early 1990s. In this sense the mechanism is similar to the one
we highlight in the U − R interaction, and we explore it in more details in section 3. Finally, we also show
that the exceptional growth conditions in R exacerbate rather than oﬀset the pattern of capital ﬂows.
2.1 The Basic Structure
2.1.1 A closed economy
Time evolves continuously. Inﬁnitesimal agents (traders) are born at a rate θ per unit time and die at the
same rate; population mass is constant and equal to one. At birth, agents receive a perishable endowment
of (1 − δ)Xt which they save in its entirety until they die (exit). Agents consume all their accumulated
resources at the time of death. The term (1 − δ)Xt should be interpreted as the share of national output
that is not capitalizable (more on this later on).
The only saving vehicles are identical “trees” producing an aggregate dividend of δXt per unit time.
Agents can save only in these trees, whose value at time is Vt. The return on the tree equals the dividend
price ratio δXt/Vt plus the capital gain ˙ Vt/Vt. This return is equal to the interest rate in the economy, rt,
so that:
rtVt = δXt + ˙ Vt. (1)
5In Caballero et al. (2006b), we also considered an E-region, composed of countries with deep ﬁnancial markets but bad
growth conditions, such as continental Europe. The U − E model has essentially similar implications as the textbook two-
country model: as a result of a growth slowdown in E, the interest rate drops almost indeﬁnitely and capital ﬂows from E to
U, resulting in a current account deﬁcit in U. While both the depressed growth conditions in E and the depressed ﬁnancial
markets in R compound to generate large and persistent capital ﬂows to U, our results indicated that the U − R interaction
played a more important role. See also Engel and Rogers (2006) for the conclusion that the U − E growth diﬀerentials is not
large enough to account for the US current account deﬁcit. However, an important caveat highlighted in the previous version
of our paper is that the growth diﬀerential between U and E also aﬀects the allocation of funds from R, in favor of U.
6Let Wt denote the savings accumulated by agents up to date t. Savings decrease with withdrawals
(deaths), and increase with the endowment allocated to new generations and the return on accumulated
savings:
˙ Wt = −θWt + (1 − δ)Xt + rtWt. (2)
In equilibrium, savings must be equal to the value of the trees:
Wt = Vt. (3)
Replacing (3) into (1), and the result into (2), yields a relation between savings and output:6
Wt =
Xt
θ
, (4)
which together with (1) and (3) yields the equilibrium interest rate:
rt =
˙ Xt
Xt
+ δθ. (5)
This interest rate is the only price in the economy for now. Conditional on exogenous output Xt, the
interest rate rises with growth because the latter lifts the rate of growth of ﬁnancial wealth demand (W),
and hence the expected capital gains from holding a tree; it rises with δ because this increases the share of
income that is capitalizable and hence the supply of assets; and it rises with θ because this lowers ﬁnancial
wealth demand and hence asset prices.
We assume that the total endowment in the economy, Xt, grows at rate g. Hence rt is given by raut
where
raut = g + δθ.
2.1.2 Discussion of our setup
This minimalist model has two ingredients that need further discussion: The parameter δ and the consump-
tion function corresponding to our particular speciﬁcation of preferences and demographics.
Let us start with the former. Denote by PVt the present value of the economy’s future output:
PVt =
  ∞
t
Xse
−
R s
t rτdτds.
The parameter δ represents the share of PVt that can be capitalized today and transformed into a tradable
asset:
Vt = δPVt.
The asset belongs to the agents currently alive, and represents their aggregate savings.
In practice, δ captures many factors behind pledgeability of future revenues. At the most basic level,
one can think of δ as the share of capital in production. But in reality only a fraction of this share can be
6By Walras’ Law, noticing that θWt corresponds to consumption, we can re-write this relation as a goods-market equilibrium
condition: θWt = Xt.
7committed to asset holders, as the government, managers, and other insiders can dilute and divert much of
proﬁts. It is for this reason that we refer to δ as an index of ﬁnancial development, by which we mean an
index of the extent to which property rights over earning are well deﬁned and tradable in ﬁnancial markets.
For given output and interest rate paths, as δ rises the share of tradeable PVt rises and that of its
complement, Nt:
Nt = (1 − δ)PVt
falls one for one.7
This takes us to the second key ingredient, our speciﬁcation of preferences and demographics. For a
change in δ to have any eﬀect, it must have an impact on prices in the closed endowment economy. In the
open economy environment we consider later on, these price eﬀects impact allocations across regions in the
world as well. In particular, δ must aﬀect the total resources perceived by consumers (and hence by savers).
If not, the economy is characterized by a situation akin to Ricardian equivalence: A rise in δ increases the
supply of assets but it also raises the demand for assets one for one since non-capitalizable future income Nt
falls by the same amount as Vt rises; as a result interest rates are left unchanged.
Thus, our choices are designed to provide the simplest model with non-Ricardian features. This is all
that matters. Of course there is a large number of alternatives to achieve the same goal, at the cost of
additional complexity. For example, we could assume a perpetual youth model ` a la Blanchard (1985) with
log preferences throughout. In fact, such a model converges to ours if instead of giving agents a ﬂow of labor
income though life, we give them a lump sum at birth.8
Moreover, our assumption of consumption in the last day of life does the same for the aggregate as
Blanchard’s annuity market, in that the agent does not need to worry about longevity risk. Similarly, Weil
(1987)’s model of population growth with inﬁnitely lived agents converges to ours if newly born agents receive
the present value of their wages at birth. In both of these models, and their extensions to include ours, the
consumption function of current agents takes the form:
Ct = θ(Wt + βtNt); βt < 1.
The key point in these model as in ours is that current consumers do not have full rights over Nt while
they do over Vt (and hence Wt).9
Finally, note that there is no need for an overlapping generations structure to have a role for asset
supply. What is needed is some demand for liquidity and that changing the supply of assets has aggregate
allocational consequence. For example, Woodford (1990)’s model of inﬁnitely lived agents with alternating
7Of course, in reality limited ﬁnancial development aﬀects not only the distribution of revenues but also output and growth.
Adding this dimension would exacerbate our results but make them less transparent.
8See our working paper version, Caballero et al. (2006b), for more details
9In Blanchard’s model, the consumption function is Ct = (p + ˜ θ)(Wt + Ht) where p is the probability of death and ˜ θ is the
discount factor. Ht represents the aggregate value of non-tradable wealth and is strictly smaller than Nt as long as p > 0.
In Weil’s model, and with the same notation, the consumption function is Ct = ˜ θ(Wt + Ht) and Ht < Nt as long as the
growth rate of population n > 0.
8liquidity demand also creates an environment where a change in the availability of ﬁnancial assets aﬀects
allocations and interest rates.
2.1.3 A Small Open Economy
Let us now open the economy, which faces a given world interest rate, r, such that:
Assumption 1 g < r < g + θ
Deﬁnition 1 (Trade Balance and Current Account): Let us denote the trade balance and current account
at time t as TBt and CAt, respectively, with:
TBt ≡ Xt − θWt
CAt ≡ ˙ Wt − ˙ Vt
The deﬁnition of the trade balance is standard. The current account is also standard; it is the dual of
the ﬁnancial account and is deﬁned as the increase in the economy’s net asset demand.10
To ﬁnd the steady state of this economy, we integrate (1) forward and (2) backward:
Vt =
  ∞
t
δXse−r(s−t)ds
Wt = W0e(r−θ)t +
  t
0
(1 − δ)Xse(r−θ)(t−s)
Assumption 1 implies that, asymptotically,
Vt
Xt
→
t→∞
δ
r − g
(6)
Wt
Xt
→
t→∞
1 − δ
g + θ − r
(7)
Equation (6) is just Gordon’s formula. It shows that the asymptotic supply of assets, normalized by
the size of the economy, is a decreasing function of r.11 Equation (7) describes the asymptotic demand for
assets which, normalized by the size of the economy, is an increasing function of r. Figure 2 represents the
equilibrium in a supply and demand diagram, a variation on the Metzler diagram. The supply curve and
demand curve cross at r = raut.
If r < raut
δ
r − g
>
1 − δ
g + θ − r
10At times it may be useful to think of the current account in terms of the trade balance and gross portfolio holdings:
CAi
t = Xi
t − θW i
t + rt(α
i,j
t V
j
t − α
j,i
t V i
t )
= TBi
t + rt(α
i,j
t V
j
t − α
j,i
t V i
t )
where i  = j, α
i,j
t is the share of region j’s trees held by agents in region i, α
j,i
t is the share of region i’s trees held by agents in
region j. In the particular case of our open economy, i corresponds to the country and j to the rest of the world.
11Note that with a constant interest rate, this expression holds not only asymptotically but at all points in time.
9,
(Supply)
(Demand)
raut
V
X = δ
r−g
W
X = 1−δ
g+θ−r
V/X W/X
r
Figure 2: The Metzler diagram.
and domestic asset supply exceeds demand. Since along the balanced growth path ˙ Wt = gWt and ˙ Vt = gVt,
the above inequality implies that the economy runs an asymptotic current account deﬁcit (ﬁnanced by an
asymptotic capital account surplus):
CAt
Xt
→
t→∞
g
 
1 − δ
g + θ − r
−
δ
r − g
 
= −g
(raut − r)
(g + θ − r)(r − g)
. (8)
Note also that, asymptotically, the trade balance is in surplus. The lower rate of return on savings depresses
wealth accumulation and, eventually, consumption
TBt
Xt
→
t→∞
raut − r
g + θ − r
. (9)
Importantly, however, this asymptotic trade surplus is not enough to service the accumulated net external
liabilities of the country, which is why the current account remains in deﬁcit forever.
Conversely, note that when r > raut, (8) and (9) still hold, but now the economy runs an asymptotic
current account surplus.
We can prove a stronger result that will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 Consider a path for the interest rate {rt}t≥0 such that limt→∞ rt = r with g < r < g + θ. Then
Vt
Xt
→
t→∞
δ
r − g
,
Wt
Xt
→
t→∞
1 − δ
g + θ − r
CAt
Xt
→
t→∞
−g
(raut − r)
(g + θ − r)(r − g)
,
TBt
Xt
→
t→∞
raut − r
g + θ − r
Proof. See the appendix.
102.2 The World Economy: Shocks
Let us now study global equilibrium with two large regions, i = {U,R}. Each of them is described by the
same setup as in the closed economy, with an instantaneous return from hoarding a unit of either tree, rt,
which is common across both regions and satisﬁes:
rtV i
t = δiXi
t + ˙ V i
t (10)
where V i
t is the value of country i’s tree at time t.
We will assume throughout this section that both regions have common parameters g and θ. Let W i
t
denote the savings accumulated by active agents in country i at date t:
˙ W i
t = −θW i
t + (1 − δi)Xi
t + rtW i
t. (11)
Adding (10) and (11) across both regions, yields:
rtVt =
 
δU − xR(δU − δR)
 
Xt + ˙ Vt (12)
˙ Wt = −θWt + (1 − δ
U + x
R(δ
U − δ
R))Xt + rtWt (13)
with
Wt = W U
t + W R
t , Vt = V U
t + V R
t , Xt = XU
t + XR
t , xR ≡
XR
t
Xt
.
From now on, the solution for global equilibrium proceeds exactly as in the closed economy above, with
θWt = Xt. (14)
and
rt = g +
 
δU − xR(δU − δR)
 
θ. (15)
Let us now specify the initial conditions and the shock.
Assumption 2 (Initial Conditions): The world is initially symmetric, with δU = δR = δ. There are no
(net) capital ﬂows across the economies and W U
t /xU = V U
t /xU = V R
t /xR = W R
t /xR.
Suppose now that, unexpectedly, at t = 0, δR drops permanently to
δR < δU.
How should we interpret a drop in δR? In general, as the realization that local ﬁnancial instruments are
less sound than they were once perceived to be. This could result from, inter alia, a crash in a bubble; the
realization that corporate governance is less benign than once thought; a signiﬁcant loss of informed and
intermediation capital; the sudden perception —justiﬁed or not— of “crony capitalism”; a sharp decline
in property rights protection, and so on. All of these factors -and more- were mentioned in the events
11surrounding the Asian/Russian crises (e.g. Fischer (1998)), and a subset of them (the “bubble” crash in
particular) have been used to describe the crash in Japan in the early 1990s.12
Lemma 2 (Continuity): At impact, r drops while V and W remain unchanged.
Proof. At any point in time, it must be true that
Wt =
Xt
θ
It follows that Wt does not jump at t = 0 : W0− = W0+ = X0/θ. Since Wt = Vt must hold at all times, we
conclude that Vt does not jump either: V0− = V0+ = X0/θ. But for this absence of a decline in V at impact
to be consistent with the asset pricing equation, the decline in the global supply of assets due to a decline
in δR must be oﬀset by a drop in r:
r0+ = g +
 
δU − xR(δU − δR)
 
θ < r0− = g + δUθ.
While global wealth and capitalization values do not change at impact, the allocation of these across
economies does. On one hand, it stands to reason that the lower δR implies that V U
0 /V R
0 must rise since
both dividend streams are discounted at the common global interest rate. On the other, whether W U
0 /W R
0
rises or not depends on the agents’ initial portfolio allocations. However, as long as there is some home bias
in these portfolios, W U
0 /W R
0 rises as well. Because the conventional view has taken the well established fact
of home bias as a key force bringing about rebalancing of portfolios, we shall assume it as well, as this isolates
the contribution of our mechanisms more starkly. Moreover, for clarity, in the main propositions we assume
an extreme form of home bias, but then extend the simulations and ﬁgures to more realistic scenarios.
Assumption 3 (Home Bias). Agents ﬁrst satisfy their saving needs with local assets and only hold foreign
assets once they run out of local assets.
This assumption implies that, at impact, local wealths’ changes match the changes in the value of local
trees one-for-one:
W R
0+ = V R
0+
W U
0+ = V U
0+
These changes in wealth have a direct impact on consumption, which are reﬂected immediately in the trade
balance and current account.
Note that our current account deﬁnition excludes, as does the one of national accounts, unexpected
valuation eﬀects – unexpected capital gains and losses from international positions. This is not a relevant
12We assume this shock is unanticipated, but this is not crucial to our analysis: Our long-run results would remain if we
relaxed this assumption, and the short-run results we derive below would hold if there was some degree of market incompleteness,
preventing agents from completely hedging away those shocks.
12issue for now since the only surprise takes place at date 0, when agents are not holding international assets.
We shall return to this issue when below.
Also note that since CAR
t +CAU
t = 0, we only need to describe one of the current accounts to characterize
both. Henceforth, we shall describe the behavior of CAU
t , with the understanding that this concept describes
features of the global equilibrium rather than U-speciﬁc features.
Proposition 1 (Crash in R’s Financial Markets): Under Assumption 3, if δ drops in R to δR < δU, then
the current account of U turns into a deﬁcit at impact and remains in deﬁcit thereafter, with CAU
t /XU
t
converging to a strictly negative limit. The interest rate falls permanently below rU
aut.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that since both regions are growing at the same rate, the interest rate remains constant
after dropping at date 0 (since xR is constant):
rt = r+ = rU
aut − xR(δU − δR)θ < rU
aut. (16)
Next, because the interest rate is constant, the values of the trees change immediately to their new
balanced growth path:
V R
t =
δRXR
t
r+ − g
, V U
t =
δUXU
t
r+ − g
.
Let us now describe the balanced growth path and then return to describe transitory dynamics. In the
balanced growth path, we know from Lemma 1 that
W R
t =
(1 − δR)XR
t
θ + g − r+ W U
t =
(1 − δ)XU
t
θ + g − r+
and
CAU
t
XU
t
= −g
rU
aut − r+
(g + θ − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0.
For transitory dynamics, deﬁne wR
t = W R
t /XR
t so that
˙ w
R
t = (r
+ − g − θ)w
R
t + (1 − δ
R).
with a balanced growth equilibrium value of (1 − δR)/(θ + g − r+).
From Assumption 3 we have that
wR
0+ =
V R
0+
XR
0
<
1 − δR
θ + g − r+
since r+ > rR
aut. That is, wR
t is below its balanced growth path at t = 0+.
Since r+ < rU
aut < g + θ, we must have ˙ wR
t > 0 when wR
t is below its steady state, or equivalently:
˙ W R
t > gWR
t
Thus we also have that U’s current account CAU
t = ˙ V R
t − ˙ W R
t is in deﬁcit – in fact, a larger deﬁcit– before
converging to its new balanced growth path.
13That is, U runs a permanent current account deﬁcit. The latter is the counterpart of the increasing
ﬂow of resources from R-savers, who have few reliable local assets to store value and hence must resort to
U-assets. In balanced growth, R-savings grow at the rate of growth of income g. If R-savings are below
output-detrended steady state, then the rate of accumulation exceeds the rate of growth of the economy and
capital ﬂows toward U grow at a fast rate – faster than g.
The collapse in δR decreases the global supply of assets by reducing the share of R’s income that can
be capitalized. The shock is entirely absorbed via a decline in world interest rates, reﬂecting a decline
in the global dividend rate from δU to δU − xR(δU − δR). While global wealth and capitalization do not
change at impact, the allocation of wealth and assets across countries does. The collapse in δR implies
that V U
0 /V R
0 must rise as an unchanged stream of U’s dividends is now discounted at a lower interest rate.
Correspondingly, under our home bias assumption, the ratio W U
0 /W R
0 must also rise.13
We can resort to the analysis of a small open economy in Section 2.1, and its Figure 2, to understand
the asymptotic result. For this, note that the equilibrium interest rate r+ falls to a level in between the two
ex-post Autarky rates rR
aut and rU
aut:
rU
aut = g + δUθ > r+ = g + δUθ − xR(δU − δR)θ > g + δRθ = rR
aut
Thus the gap between W U
t /XU
t and V U
t /XU
t is negative and non-vanishing (see Lemma 1). Or, from the
other region’s perspective, the gap between W R
t /XR
t and V R
t /XR
t is positive and non-vanishing. Figure 3
presents the asymptotic result. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium at A and A∗ with a world interest
rate rU
aut, the decline in δR shifts the V R/XR curve to the left – decline in asset supply – and the W R/XR
curve to the right – increase in asset demand. The world interest rate declines just enough so that the net
foreign assets in U (NAU ≡ W U − V U < 0) and the net foreign assets in R (NAR ≡ W R − V R > 0) sum
to zero. Note that the asymptotic result remain unchanged irrespective of the degree of home bias that we
assume. Our home bias assumption only has bite in the short run.
Figure 4 characterizes the entire path following a collapse of δR calibrated so that R’s asset prices drop
by 25% on impact, which is roughly the extent of the shock during the Asian/Russian crisis (see the next
section for calibration details). Panel A shows that U’s current account exhibits a large initial deﬁcit of 10
percent. This sharp and concentrated initial drop is due to the absence of realistic smoothing mechanisms in
the model. Still, note that even in this fast environment current account deﬁcits are persistent. The current
account remains negative along the path and asymptotes at -1.4 percent of output. The large initial current
account deﬁcits worsen the net foreign asset position from -3 percent at impact to -48 percent (panel B).
The real interest rate drops by slightly more than 25 basis points and remains permanently lower. Finally,
U’s share in R’s portfolio increases gradually from 7 percent (immediately after the shock) to 31 percent.14
13It is easy to show that if δR crashes to zero, then a bubble must arise in U-trees. While that drop in δR is extreme, it
captures the ﬂavor of the behavior of U’s asset markets in recent years. In the less extreme version we have highlighted, we still
capture this ﬂavor through the rise in the value of U’s fundamentals following the decline in equilibrium interest rates.
14The initial jump from 5 to 7 percent reﬂects the drop in R’s wealth and jump in V U at t = 0+.
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Figure 3: The Metzler diagram for a permanent drop in δR.
In summary, the model is able to generate, simultaneously, large and long lasting current account deﬁcits
in U (Fact 1); a decline in real interest rates (Fact 2) and an increase in the share of U’s assets in global
portfolios (Fact 3).
Importantly, CAU
t /XU
t does not vanish asymptotically as it converges to:
CAU
t
XU
t
= −g
(δU − δR)xRθ
(θ + g − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0.
The reason for this asymptotic deﬁcit is that excess savings needs in R grow with R’s output.
Note also that the size of the permanent current account deﬁcit in U (relative to output) is increasing in
the relative size of R (equal to xR). This observation hints at an important additional source of large and
persistent deﬁcits in U. In practice, the rate of growth of signiﬁcant parts of the R region exceeds that of
U, and hence the relative importance of this source of funding of U-deﬁcits rises over time — both, because
of diﬀerential growth and because many R countries are gradually globalizing. We turn to these secular
mechanisms next.
2.3 The World Economy: Trends
Aside from shocks, there are important trends that interact with the mechanisms we have discussed. For
example, many of the low-δ regions are among the fastest growing regions in the world. Similarly, many
of these regions are also high saving (low-θ) regions. In this section we focus on these medium and low
frequency interactions.
2.3.1 Fast growth and integration of low-δ regions
Standard models imply that capital ﬂows from low to high growth economies. We argue here that this
conclusion can be overturned when the fast growth region is one with limited ability to generate assets for
15Figure 4: A Permanent Collapse in δR
savers (low δ). In particular, faster growth in low δ regions may imply lower long run interest rates and
larger current account deﬁcits for the low growth / high δ economy.15
Let us maintain the assumption that δU − δR > 0, but replace the symmetric growth assumption by:
gR > gU.
The interest rate in this case is:
rt = (1 − xR
t )
 
gU + δUθ
 
+ xR
t (gR + δRθ). (17)
Let us assume that the additional growth in R is not enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of a lower δR on interest
rates. In particular:
Assumption 4 (Lower autarky rate in R) rR
aut = gR + δRθ < rU
aut − xR
0 (δU − δR)θ < rU
aut = gU + δUθ.
Proposition 2 (High growth in low δ region) Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, and that gR > gU.
If at date 0 the two regions integrate (or δR drops in a previously integrated world), then:
r
U
aut > r0+ > r∞ = r
R
aut
15In the working paper version of this paper (Caballero et al. (2006b)), we show that the standard view applies for ﬂows
from Europe to the US. Lower growth in the former leads to capital outﬂows toward the latter. The preceding results indicate
that the conventional view of looking at the growth rate of the trading partners to determine the pattern of net capital ﬂows is
incorrect. It matters a great deal who is growing faster and who is growing slower than the US. If those that compete with the
US in asset production (such as Europe) grow slower and those that demand assets (such as emerging Asia and oil producing
economies) grow faster, then both factors play in the direction of generating capital ﬂows toward the US.
16and the asymptotic current account deﬁcit in U relative to its output is larger when gR > gU than when
gR = gU:
lim
t→∞
g
R>g
U
CAU
t
XU
t
< lim
t→∞
g
R=g
U
CAU
t
XU
t
< 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
The result in this proposition is intuitive given the previous proposition: As R’s growth rises, so does its
demand for ﬁnancial assets. Since this rise is not matched by an increase in R’s ability to generate ﬁnancial
assets, these must be found in U and interest rates drop as the price of U-assets rise. The corresponding
increase in capital ﬂows ﬁnances the larger current account deﬁcit in U. Long run interest rates are lower
than short term interest rates because the relative importance of the country with excess demand for assets,
R, rises over time.
As before, let us now describe the asymptotic result in terms of Figure 2, from Section 2.1. First, since
in the long run R dominates the global economy when gR > gU, the equilibrium interest rate converges to
the Autarky interest rate for R:
r∞ = rR
aut = gR + δRθ.
Thus, relative to XR
t , the gap between W R
t and V R
t is vanishing, and so is that between W U
t and V U
t .
However, note that this limit interest rate is below the Autarky rate in U:
r∞ = g
R + δ
Rθ < g
U + δ
Uθ = r
U
aut.
The inequality implies that, relative to XU
t , the gap between W U
t and V U
t is negative and not vanishing.
Moreover, since
r∞ < r+ < rU
aut,
that gap is larger when gR > gU than when gR = gU.
2.3.2 Fast growth and integration of low-θ regions
From the interest rate expression (r = g + δθ), it is apparent that there is a certain symmetry between the
impact of a decline in δR and of a drop in θR (a formalization of the “saving-glut” hypothesis). However,
while both have similar implications for capital ﬂows and interest rates, only the δ story is consistent with
the observed decline in asset prices in the R region at the time of the inﬂection point in capital ﬂows during
the late 1990s (see Figure 1).
We view the low θR story as an appealing lower frequency mechanism, which is playing an increasingly
important role. As low θ economies such as China integrate to the global economy and grow in their relative
contribution to global output, their high net demand for assets leads to lower interest rates and larger capital
ﬂows toward U.16
16The recent paper by Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) can be seen as a nice elaboration on this story. In their case
the reason for θR < θU is the higher development of risk sharing markets (and hence lesser need for precautionary savings) in
17The analysis is analogous to that for a low δR scenario. Moreover, in practice these factors compound as
many of the low δ economies are also low θ economies (e.g., China). However, for analytical clarity, let us
set δU = δR = δ for now and instead assume that
θU − θR > 0
and
gR > gU.
The interest rate in this case is (see the appendix for a detailed derivation):
rt =
 
i
xi
tri
aut +
 
i
xi
tθi  
θiW i
t/Xi
t − 1
 
(18)
The ﬁrst term of this expression is the output-weighted average of the autarky interest rates ri
aut = gi +δθi.
The second term represents a demand eﬀect. A reallocation of wealth towards countries with high propensity
to consume – high θ – decreases the demand for assets. For a given level of output, this demand term puts
upward pressure on world interest rates.
As in the previous section, we assume that the additional growth in R is not enough to oﬀset the eﬀect
of a lower θR on interest rates:
Assumption 5 (Lower autarky rate in R) rR
aut = gR + δθR < rU
aut = gU + δθU
Then:
Proposition 3 (High growth in low θ region) Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 5 hold, and that gR > gU.
If at date 0 the two regions integrate, then:
r∞ = r
R
aut
and the asymptotic current account deﬁcit in U relative to its output is larger when gR > gU than when
gR = gU:
lim
t→∞
g
R>g
U
CAU
t
XU
t
< lim
t→∞
g
R=g
U
CAU
t
XU
t
< 0
We omit the proof of this proposition since it follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2. The
result is intuitive: As R’s growth rises, so does its demand for ﬁnancial assets. Since this rise is not matched
by an increase in R’s ability to generate ﬁnancial assets, these must be found in U and interest rates drop
as the price of U-assets rise. The corresponding increase in capital ﬂows ﬁnances the larger current account
deﬁcit in U. Long run interest rates with gR > gU are lower because the relative importance of the country
with excess demand for assets, R, rises over time.
U than in R. In addition to its substantive point, this observation allows us to illustrate the ﬂexibility of the framework we
propose to address a wide variety of issues at once, which can then be individually studied with more detailed models.
183 Quantitative Relevance
In this section we provide support for and deepen the quantitative aspects of the analysis presented in the
previous sections. Note, however, that the strength of the framework we have developed is its simplicity
and versatility. It is not designed to match high frequency dynamics or to make very precise quantitative
statements. Our goal here is simply to show that the mechanisms we have described up to now are of the
right order of magnitude.
3.1 ‘Calibration’
Table 1 summarizes the parameter assumptions. The calibration of the model requires parameter values for
δ, θ, g, which we assign based on US aggregate data.
Parameter θ g δ xR
0 µRU
0− NAU
0− δR
Value 0.25 3% 0.12 0.3 0.05 0 0.08
Table 1: Main Parameters
Equation (4) shows that θ is the output to wealth ratio, X/W. We estimate W as the net worth of the
household sector, which according to the U.S. Flow of Funds is $48.16 trillion in 2004.17 With a U.S. GDP
of $11.72 trillion in 2004, this implies a value of θ = 11.72/48.16 ≃ 0.24. In the simulations, we round this
parameter to 0.25. Average real output growth in the U.S. between 1950 and 2004 equals 3.33%. We round
this number and set g to 3 percent. Finally, since we cannot measure the share of capitalizable income
directly, we calibrate the value of δ indirectly. To do so, we assume a value of raut of 6%. This implies
a value of δ of (raut − g)/θ = 0.12, which corresponds to about a third of the share of capital in national
accounts.
We now explore a number of relevant scenarios.
3.2 Section 2.2 scenario: A Permanent Asset Supply Shock
We start with the analysis of a permanent collapse in δR in a U −R world, as discussed in section 2.2. To do
so, we need to construct initial output shares xi
0, initial cross border portfolio holdings µ
ij
0 = α
ij
0 V
j
0 /W i
0 and
the drop in δR. We deﬁne U as the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. These countries are good asset suppliers,
and experienced robust growth in the past decade.18 We identify R with developing and oil producing
countries with a good income growth potential, but limited asset production capacity.19
17See the Balance Sheet Table B100, line 41 of the December 2005 release.
18UK and Australia’s annual real GDP growth rate averaged 2.49% and 3.32% respectively between 1980 and 2004.
19In our sample, R includes the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt,
Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thai-
land and Venezuela. Output data for Poland and Russia starts in 1990.
19We measure the initial output share as the average output share between 1980 and 1990, using GDP
data in current dollars from the World Development Indicators. We ﬁnd xR
0 = XR
0 /
 
XR
0 + XU
0
 
≈ 0.30.
We estimate the initial holdings of U assets by the rest of the world as the ratio of U.S. gross external
liabilities to the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the world. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis
International Investment Position, U.S. gross external liabilities reached $2.5 trillion in 1990.20 To estimate
the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the world, we calculate the ratio of ﬁnancial wealth to output for the U.S.,
the E.U. and Japan between 1982 and 2004.21 We ﬁnd a GDP weighted average of 2.48. We apply this
ratio to the GDP of the rest of the world and estimate, for 1990, a rest-of-the-world ﬁnancial wealth of $39.3
trillion. This yields a portfolio share equal to 2.5/39.3 = 0.06. We round this number to µ
R,U
0− = 5%. We
also assume that the world starts in a symmetric steady state with zero initial net foreign asset position.22
Finally, we calibrate the decline in δR so as to match the average decline in stock market values around
the time of the Asian crisis. From Section 2.2, R’s assets price drops from V R
0− = XR
0 /θ before the shock to
V R
0+ = δR/θ¯ δXR
0 where ¯ δ = xU
0 δ +xR
0 δR is the world capitalization index. Hence the drop in asset values at
t = 0 is V R
0+/V R
0− = δR/¯ δ < 1. Solving this expression for δR, we obtain
δR = δ
xU
0 V R
0+
V R
0− − xR
0 V R
0+
Since our model does not have short-run liquidity and ﬁre-sale mechanisms, we chose to calibrate the
decline in prices not at impact but over a couple of years (between July 1997 and June 1999). At this
frequency, the decline in dollar asset values was 16 percent in Hong-Kong, 5 percent in Korea and 62 percent
in Indonesia.23 Figure (4) was generated with a 25 percent decline in V R: V R
0+ = 0.75V R
0−, which is within
the range observed in the data and implies δR = 0.08.
3.3 The World Economy: Asian Shocks.
We now turn to a set of more complex and realistic scenarios. We consider ﬁrst a three-region world,
U −J −R, where J stands for Japan and R stands -as before- for emerging and oil producing countries. We
start this economy in steady state in 1990 with initial output shares xJ
0 = 0.22 and xR
0 = 0.23. The initial
portfolio shares are calibrated such that there are no initial external imbalances and µJU
0 = µRU
0 = 0.05. In
this initial steady state, we assume that δJ > δ. This captures the eﬀect of the Japanese ﬁnancial bubble of
20Source: BEA, NIIP Table 2, line 25, July 2006 release.
21Sources: U.S.: Flow of Funds, Table B100 line 8, household ﬁnancial assets; E.U.: Table 3.1 of the ECB Bulletin, ﬁ-
nancial and capital account of the non ﬁnancial sector; Japan: Flow of Funds, households total ﬁnancial assets, available at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat f.htm.
22According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the US had a balanced net foreign asset position in 1988. This implies
αRU
0 = µRU
0−
xR
0
1−xR
0
= 0.02 and αUR
0 = αRUV U/V R = αRU
￿
1 − xR
￿
/xR = 0.05.
23We calculate the decline of the Hang Sen Composite Index (Hong Kong), the KOSPI (Korea) and the Jakarta Stock Index
(Indonesia). All price indices were converted into dollars using daily exchange rates. The larger declines observed over shorter
horizons can be attributed to the stock market and exchange rate overshooting.
20the 1980’s. To preserve the symmetry of the problem, we also impose rJ
aut = rU
aut by setting θJ = δθ/δJ < θ.
The lower θJ is consistent with the higher Japanese national saving rate.
This world economy experiences two consecutive shocks. First, in 1990, we interpret the collapse of the
Japanese bubble as a permanent collapse in δJ, back to δ. We calibrate the initial δJ so as to to match
the 30% decline in the Nikkei stock index between December 1989 and December 1991, and ﬁnd δJ = 0.19.
Second, we interpret the 1997-1999 Asian and Russian crisis as a collapse in δR calibrated to a 25% decline
in stock market values in R. We consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst and main scenario, the collapse is
permanent. This yields δR = 0.08. In the second scenario, the collapse is temporary, and we impose -
somewhat arbitrarily- that δR reverts to δ after 35 years, which yields δR = 0.05.24 The purpose of the
second scenario is simply to show that nothing important is being driven by the behavior of the model at
inﬁnity when the shock is permanent.
Table 2 reports averagevalues for the current account-output ratio, the net foreign asset position, the equi-
librium interest rate,and the share of U in global portfolios (deﬁned as µ.U =
 
αRU + αJU 
V U/
 
W R + W J 
).
Model Data
Interval (years): 1990 − 1997 1997 − 2006 2006 − 2020 2020 − 2050 ∞ 90 − 97 97 − 06
Shock: P T P T P T P T P T
CA
U/X
U -6.2 -6.2 -7.0 -6.6 -3.3 -2.1 -2.9 -1.3 -2.9 -1.8 -1.1 -4.3
NFA
U/X
U -22.3 -22.3 -73.4 -72.5 -93.7 -83.9 -96.2 -64.5 -96.3 -59.1 -3.9 -17.7
r − raut 0.10 0.10 -0.48 -0.64 -0.52 -0.67 -0.53 -0.47 -0.53 -0.34 -0.78 -1.63
µ
.U 9.7 9.7 20.0 19.7 23.3 21.2 23.7 17.4 23.7 16.4 7.3 16.0
Table 2: Calibrated Exercise 1: Asian Shocks. All variables in percent. Columns labelled “P” (“T”) for
permanent (transitory) shocks
Starting from an initial interest rate of 6 percent, the collapse in δJ lowers asset values in J and reallocates
demand from low θ countries (J) to high θ ones (U and R). The resulting increase in demand on the goods
market pushes up world interest rates by 10 basis points, to 6.10 percent on average for the ﬁrst 7 years.
The current account in U worsens signiﬁcantly, to -6.2 percent of output and U′s net foreign asset position
falls to -22 percent of output. In 1997, the unexpected decline in δR reduces world interest rates by 58 basis
points, and increases global imbalances. The current account deﬁcit surges to -7 percent and net foreign
debt increases to 73 percent of output while the share of foreign assets in foreign portfolios increases from
10 percent to 20 percent.
After 2006, these imbalances are gradually reduced. In the case where the δR shock is permanent (columns
labelled “P”), the U.S. net foreign debt position stabilizes at 96 percent of output, with a long run current
24The required collapse in δR is more severe in the latter case, since for a given δR, V R does not collapse as much when
shocks are transitory.
21account deﬁcit of 2.9 percent of output, and world interest rates permanently depressed by 53 basis points.
When the δR shock is expected to be temporary (columns labelled “T”), the dynamics are broadly similar,
but the rebalancing is more signiﬁcant, with a long run net debt position of 59 percent of output and a
current account deﬁcit of 1.8 percent of output.
Comparing the ﬁrst two periods (1990-1997 and 1997-2006) to the data in the last two column of the
table, we observe that the model predicts a smaller decline in world interest rates (47 basis points versus 150
in the data), and a larger build-up in imbalances (7.0 percent deﬁcit of the current account, versus 4.3 in the
data). The model also overpredicts the impact of the Japanese crash on imbalances. These departures are
largely due to the assumption of perfect capital markets integration and the lack of additional frictions to
adjustment. However, as we mentioned earlier, our purpose here is only to show that the mechanism yields
numbers of the right order of magnitude, which it does.
3.4 The World Economy: Emerging Trends
The next scenario considers a three region world U − Uc − M. U and Uc are identical and initially in
steady state (Uc represents J and R economies diﬀerent from M). M represents a subset of emerging
markets accounting initially for half of the non-U part of the world economy (i.e. xM
0 = xU
c
0 = 0.25).
We assume that this region has initially a poor capacity to produce ﬁnancial assets (we set δM = 0.05,
similar to the post Asian crisis value for δR in our previous scenario), a high propensity to save (we set
θM = 0.2) and a faster growth rate gM = 4.5%. Hence the autarky interest rate in M is low relative to
rU
aut
 
rM
aut = gM + δMθM = 5.5%
 
. In 1990, we assume that M perfectly integrates into the world economy.
Again, we consider two possible cases. In the ﬁrst case, δM and gM are permanently diﬀerent. In the second
case, they converge to their values in U after 60 years.
Model data
Interval (years): 1990 − 1997 1997 − 2006 2006 − 2020 2020 − 2050 ∞ 90 − 97 97 − 06
Shock: P T P T P T P T P T
CA
U/X
U -4.2 -4.1 -2.1 -2.1 -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 -2.7 -1.5 -1.1 -4.3
NFA
U/X
U -15.5 -15.3 -32.1 -31.7 -39.5 -38.9 -47.2 -45.9 -88.9 -51.3 -3.9 -17.7
r − raut -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23 -0.50 -0.31 -0.78 -1.63
µ
.U 5.9 5.9 8.9 8.8 9.3 9.2 8.6 8.4 0.0 7.8 7.3 16.0
Table 3: Calibrated Exercise 2: Emerging Trends. All variables in percent.“P” (“T”) for permanent (tran-
sitory) shocks.
Table 3 presents the results. The integration of M into the world economy lowers world equilibrium
interest rate. This eﬀect is initially muted since the reallocation of consumption from low θ (M) to high θ
(U and Uc) countries reduces current asset demand and because M is initially small. Nevertheless, external
22imbalances build-up immediately with a U current account deﬁcit averaging -4.2 percent and net foreign
assets of -15 percent of output. Over time, as M grows, the world equilibrium interest rate converges slowly
toward rM
aut. The resulting imbalances in U increase and stabilize at -89 percent of output (NFA) and -2.7
percent (CA). This process is very gradual, essentially controlled by the growth diﬀerential between the two
regions. Again, the dynamics are similar when the shock is expected to reverse after 60 years.
We conclude that this secular mechanism also can account for a signiﬁcant share of the global facts
described in Figure 1.
4 Investment Slumps and Foreign Direct Investment
Let us now add an investment margin to our model and a reason for foreign direct investment (FDI). We
capture the former with the emergence of options to plant new trees over time, and the latter with U’s
ability to convert new R trees into δU (rather than δR) trees. These additions enrich the framework along
two important dimensions in matching the facts: First, the collapse in δR can lead to an investment slump in
R which exacerbates our results in the previous section. Second, the intermediation rents from FDI reduce
the trade surpluses that U needs to generate to repay for its persistent early deﬁcits.25
4.1 An Investment Margin and Slump
Let us split aggregate output in each region into the number of trees, N, and the output per tree, Z:
Xi
t = Ni
tZi
t
At each point in time, gnNi
t options to plant new trees arise. These options are distributed to newborns at
birth. At the same time, the output of each planted tree grows at the rate gz. Planting the gnNi
t new trees
consumes resources Ii
t:
Ii
t = κXi
t.
25The argument in this section is related to that in Despres, Kindleberger and Salant (1966) and Kindleberger (1965), who
during the Bretton Woods era argued that the US had a unique role as a provider of international currency liquidity. More
recently, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) have documented that the total return on US gross assets (mostly equity and FDI)
consistently exceeded the total return on gross liabilities (mostly safe instruments) by an average of 3.32 percent per year since
1973. Of course part of this excess return is due to the risk-premium diﬀerential associated to the leveraged nature of US
investments. Our analysis omits this risk dimension and focuses on the “intermediation” rent obtained by the US.
Everything suggests that this “intermediation” role of the US has only grown in importance as total gross capital ﬂows
to/from the US have risen from $222 billion in 1990 to $2.3 trillion in 2004 (see BEA, US International Transactions Accounts,
Table 1). See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for a systematic analysis of cross border ﬂows and positions for a large sample
of countries.
23Let us assume ﬁrst that κ is low enough so that all investment options are exercised (see below), and hence
aggregate output grows at rate g, with (equal for both regions):
g = gn + gz.
Suppose for now that δi is speciﬁc to the region where the tree is planted, not to who planted it. Then
rtV i
t = δiXi
t + ˙ V i
t − gnV i
t (19)
where V i
t represents the value of all (new and old) trees planted at time t in region i, and ˙ V i
t −gnV i
t represents
the expected capital gains from those trees.
The options to invest are allocated to all those alive at time t within each region, who immediately
exercise them by investing Ii
t.26 Thus,
˙ W i
t = (rt − θ)W i
t + (1 − δi)Xi
t + gnV i
t − Ii
t.
As usual, aggregating across both regions to ﬁnd the equilibrium interest rate, yields:
rtVt = δ
UXt − (δ
U − δ
R)X
R
t + ˙ Vt − g
nVt (20)
˙ Wt = (rt − θ)Wt + (1 − δU)Xt + (δU − δR)XR
t + gnVt − It (21)
so that:
Wt = Vt = (1 − κ)
Xt
θ
.
and
r = gz +
θ
1 − κ
(δU − xR(δU − δR)) < rU
aut = gz +
θδU
1 − κ
, (22)
which amounts to the same model as in the previous section, with the exceptions that only the rate of growth
of output per-tree enters, and that the investment cost reduces wealth accumulation and hence raises the
interest rate (since it lowers the price of trees).
Let us now assume that the drop in δR is large enough that investment is not privately proﬁtable in R (κ
is large relative to gnV R
t /XR
t ). This immediately delivers an (extreme) investment slump in R.27 Moreover,
the equations for R change to:
gR = gz < g.
26Note that the share of options that are allocated to existing owners of trees are subsumed within the Z component. In fact,
we can reinterpret the model in Section 2 as an investment model where all the options are allocated to the owners of existing
trees. The only reason we modiﬁed the allocation of options in this section is to spread the excess returns from FDI over time
in a more realistic manner (otherwise the entire capitalized excess returns accrues to the ﬁrst generation in U).
27See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a more detailed emerging markets model where the collapse in the “bubble”
component of (something like) δR leads to an investment slowdown in R.
24rtV
R
t = δ
RX
R
t + ˙ V
R
t (23)
˙ W R
t = (rt − θ)W R
t + (1 − δR)XR
t . (24)
Solving for global equilibrium, yields:
Vt = Wt = (1 − κx
U
t )
Xt
θ
.
Note that now at the time of the crash in δR there is an increase in the value of global assets equal to:
∆V0 = κ
XR
t
θ
> 0.
The mechanism behind this increase in asset value —made of a milder decline in asset values in R and a
sharper appreciation in U— is a further drop in interest rates at impact following the investment collapse
in R.28 Moreover, the latter exacerbates the initial current and trade deﬁcit in U.
The following proposition summarizes these results more precisely and is proved in the appendix. It
compares two situations when gnV R
t /XR
t < κ. In situation 1, R agents make the optimal decision not to
invest. In situation 2, which is intended only to serve as a benchmark, R agents are forced to exercise their
investment options.
Proposition 4 (Investment slump) At impact, the drop in interest rate is larger under situation 1 than
under situation 2. Also, the initial current account and trade balance deﬁcits in U are larger in situation 1
than in situation 2.
4.2 An Intermediation Margin: Foreign Direct Investment
Let us now assume that R residents can sell the options to the new trees to U residents at price, P:
Pt = κPXRn
t .
where XRn
t denotes the output from the trees sold to U. We think of this price as the result of some bargaining
process but its particular value is not central for our substantive message as long as it leaves some surplus
to U.
There are gains from trade: If U residents plant the new R trees, the share of output from the new trees
that can be capitalized rises from δR to δU. Suppose that Pt is such that all new R trees are planted by U
residents. In fact, the following assumption ensures that U investors and R sellers gain from foreign direct
investment along the entire path.
28Note that in the long run the interest rate converges to raut since now U is growing faster than R. However this long run
rise is not enough to oﬀset the sharp decline in interest rates in the short (and medium) run.
25Figure 5: A Collapse in δR with and without FDI
Assumption 6 (Asymptotic Bilateral Private Gains from FDI) Let κP and (δU −δR) be such that:
gn δU
rU
aut − gz > κ + κP > gn δR
rU
aut − gz
Proposition 5 If Assumption 6 holds, then U runs an asymptotic trade deﬁcit ﬁnanced by its intermediation
rents.
Proof. See the appendix.
Does this mean that the intertemporal approach of the current account has been violated? Certainly
not. It simply means that the intermediation rents rather than future trade surpluses pay for the initial
(and now permanent) trade deﬁcits. Alternatively, one could account for these intermediation services as
“non-traditional” net exports and imports for U and R, respectively. In which case, we have:
  TB
U
t = TBU
t + gnV R
t − (κ + κP)XR
t
and, assuming raut > g so the integral converges, it follows that:
W U
t − V U
t = −
  +∞
t
  TB
U
s e−
R s
t rududs
Figure 5 reports the path of U’s trade balance following a collapse in δR.29 We consider three cases:
ﬁrst, when κP is suﬃciently high that no FDI takes place. Second, when all the rents asymptotically go
29We calibrate the decline in δR as before, to a drop in V R of 50%. See the appendix for details of the simulation.
26to R (i.e. when the second inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly) and lastly when all the rents from
FDI asymptotically go to U (i.e. when the ﬁrst inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly).30 We assume
parameters such that in all cases the investment options are exercised. The model without FDI is very
similar to the model of section 2.2: following a collapse in δR, the interest rate falls permanently from
rU
aut to ¯ r = gz + ¯ δθ/(1 − κ) where ¯ δ is the fraction of world income that can be capitalized. By now, the
consequences are well known: the wealth transfer to U generates a trade deﬁcit, an accumulation of foreign
debt, eventually followed by trade surpluses (panel D).
In the presence of FDI, the results are starkly diﬀerent. Let’s start with the long run. The asymptotic
eﬀect of FDI is to increase the supply of U-like assets suﬃciently to oﬀset the initial shock. This has a strong
implication for the path of net foreign assets (panel B): since rt converges to rU
aut as long as FDI takes place
(Panel C), the Metzler diagram tells us that long run external imbalances disappear asymptotically. This is
independent of the cost of ownership of the R trees (κP) as long as Assumption 6 is satisﬁed. The reason is
that κP controls the distribution of wealth between U and R, leaving total wealth unchanged.
Consider the short run now. The interest rate satisﬁes (see the appendix for a derivation):
rt = gz +
θ
1 − κ
 
δ
 
xU
t + xRn
t
 
+ δRxRo
t
 
−
θ
1 − κ
gnNR
0 vRo
t
Xt
 
δ
δR − 1
 
(25)
where xRn
t (resp. xRo
t ) denote the new (resp. old) R’s trees share of world output and vRn
t (resp. vRo
t )
represent the value of one new (resp. old) R tree. The last term of this equation makes clear that initially
rt < ¯ r since vRo
0 > 0 and δ > δR. The reason for this last term is the initial increase in asset demand arising
from the total ﬂow of ﬁnancial savings generated by FDI.31
In the short run, FDI increases asset demand -which lowers further interest rates; in the long run, it
increases asset supply, which brings interest rates back to raut. From (19) and (25) we note also that the
dynamics of interest rates and asset values are independent of κP, as long as FDI takes place. Hence, the
initial increase in U’s wealth is also independent of the cost of FDI. It follows that U’s initial trade imbalance
XU
0 − θW U
0 − IU
0 is also independent of κP. Indeed, we observe on Panels A and D that U’s initial current
accounts and trade deﬁcits are the same for diﬀerent realizations of κP.
A lower value of κP – and correspondingly higher rents for U – implies a permanently larger trade deﬁcit
in U, ranging from 0 to 4% of output (Panel D).
To understand why U runs asymptotic trade deﬁcits as soon as it has strictly positive asymptotic sur-
pluses, consider ﬁrst the case where U has no FDI rents asymptotically. In that case, U has no asymptotic
trade deﬁcit either. Yet, Panel D indicates that U never runs a trade surplus. The reason is that U earns
30For this simulation, we assume κ = 0, gn = g = 0.03, gz = 0 and we vary κP between 5% and 12%. For comparability, we
also choose δU so that rU
aut = 6%. We obtain δ = 0.24.
31In other words, when there is FDI, savings decline less in U and increase more in R. The precise allocation depends upon
the value of κP. The reason for the additional savings is the future rise in interest rates which depresses current asset values
(and hence short run rates have to fall more to restore equilibrium).
27rents on its FDI investment along the path, which allow it to run trade deﬁcits in every period. In fact, we
can deﬁne these rents (over total wealth W U) as:
χt =
gnNR
t vRn
t − (κp + κ)XRn
t − κXRo
t
W U
t
Asymptotically, these rents converge (from above) to
χ∞ =
 
gn δU
r∞ − gz − (κp + κ)
 
XR
t
W U
t
(26)
which is equal to zero when the ﬁrst inequality of Assumption 6 holds exactly.
We can now understand why U can run permanent trade deﬁcits: When Assumption 6 holds strictly,
intermediation rents remain positive and provide the resources to ﬁnance permanent trade deﬁcits.
5 Multiple Goods and Exchange Rates
Up to now, our conclusions have abstracted from (real) exchange rate considerations. The main point of this
section is to show that adding such dimension to the model does not alter out main conclusions with respect
to the impact of diﬀerences in the level of δ across diﬀerent regions of the world. While adding multiple
goods allows us to generate exchange rate patterns from our shocks that resemble those observed in recent
data —in particular, the appreciation of U in the short run following a collapse in δR and the persistent
but gradual depreciation at later stages— the behavior of capital ﬂows and interest rates remain largely
unchanged.
5.1 Preliminaries
Let us return to the framework in Section 2, without an investment margin, but extend it to consider
diﬀerentiated goods. Each region i produces one type of good Xi, while its consumers have the following
constant elasticity preferences (CES):
Ci =


 
j
γ
1
σ
ijxj
σ−1
σ


σ
σ−1
(27)
where σ represents the –constant– elasticity of substitution between the goods from any two regions. The
coeﬃcients γij measure the strength of preferences for the various goods and satisfy
 
j γij = 1. Assumption
7 below imposes that agents have a preference for their home good. This assumption is well-established
empirically. It also generates relative demand eﬀects that will be important for exchange rate dynamics.
Assumption 7 (Consumption Home Bias) Each agent has a preference for the home good: γii ≡ γ > 0.5.
Let XU be the numeraire good and deﬁne qj as the price of good j in terms of good U (with the convention
qU = 1). Given (27), the Fisher-ideal price indices are:
P i =


 
j
γijqj(1−σ)


1/(1−σ)
28and the real exchange rate between regions i and k is
λik =
P k
P i =
  
j γkjqj(1−σ)
 
j γijqj(1−σ)
 1/(1−σ)
This expression highlights the importance of consumption home bias for exchange rate movements: if γij =
γkj for all j, then purchasing power parity obtains and the real exchange rate is equal to 1.
Given CES preferences, the demand for good j by residents of region i satisfy:
xij = γijCi
 
qj
P i
 −σ
, ∀i,j
and equilibrium in the goods market imposes
 
i
xij = Xj, ∀j.
Substituting P iCi = θW i (where domestic wealth is now measured in terms of U’s good), the equilibrium
condition for good i can be rewritten as:
θ
 
i
γij
W i
P i
 
qj
P i
 −σ
= X
j, ∀j.
5.2 A Drop in δR
Consider now the interaction between U and R. As before, let’s consider a scenario where R’s ability to
capitalize ﬁnancial assets drops from δU to δR < δU while gR = gU = g.
Following the same steps as before, we obtain:
Vt = Wt =
Xt
θ
where Xt = XU
t + qR
t XR
t , Vt = V U
t + V R
t and Wt = W U
t + W R
t . The instantaneous rate of return now
satisﬁes:
rt = r
U
aut + x
R
t
 
˙ qR
t
qR
t
− θ(δ
U − δ
R)
 
which is similar to equation (15), except for the rate of change of the terms of trade.
Proposition 6 : Under Assumptions 3 and 7, if δ drops in R to δR < δU , then U’s real exchange rate
initially appreciates, then depreciates and stabilizes in the long run. The current account of U turns into
a deﬁcit at impact and remains in deﬁcit thereafter, with CAU
t /XU
t converging to a strictly negative limit.
The interest rate falls permanently below rU
aut.
Proof. On impact, home bias in asset holdings implies that U-residents are richer and R-residents are
poorer following the collapse in δR. Combined with home-bias in consumption, this implies that relative
demand for U-goods rises in the short run, leading to an appreciation in U’s real exchange rate (a decline
in qR). On the other hand, in the long run, since output growth is the same in both countries, we have
29˙ qR
t /qR
t = 0. Substituting the latter condition into the expression for rt, we obtain the asymptotic interest
rate:
lim
t→∞
rt = r+
∞ = rU
aut − xR
∞(δU − δR)θ < rU
aut
where xR
∞ represents the asymptotic share of R’s output. Now Lemma 1 applies, so that
V R
t
qR
t XR
t
→
t→∞
δR
r
+
∞ − g
;
V U
t
XU
t
→
t→∞
δU
r
+
∞ − g
,
W R
t
qR
t XR
t
→
t→∞
1 − δR
θ + g − r
+
∞
;
W U
t
XU
t
→
t→∞
1 − δU
θ + g − r
+
∞
and the asymptotic current account satisﬁes
CAU
t
XU
t
→
t→∞
g
 
1 − δU
θ + g − r
+
∞
−
δU
r
+
∞ − g
 
< 0.
Since rU
aut > r+
∞, U runs a permanent current account deﬁcit.
The results of Proposition 1 carry through with one exception: the asymptotic output share xR
∞ may
diﬀer from the initial output share xR
0 . It is immediate that the current account deﬁcit will be larger if
r+
∞ < r+, or, from the formula for r+
∞, if
xR
∞ > xR
0 .
Since xR
t = qR
t XR
0 /
 
qR
t XR
0 + XU
0
 
, this is equivalent to qR
∞ > qR
0 or λ∞ > λ0. If the real exchange
rate depreciates asymptotically, which it does in our simulations, the asymptotic current account worsens,
compared to the single good case.
The conventional rebalancing channel has implications for exchange rate movements but does not aﬀect
the core story for capital ﬂows, which lies somewhere else in global asset markets.32 In fact, although small
for our calibrated parameters, adding the exchange rate dimension allows U to run larger asymptotic current
account deﬁcits and hold larger net foreign liabilities. The reason is that the long run depreciation reduces
U’s share of output (1 − xU
∞). This is equivalent to a further reduction in the global supply of assets and
pushes world interest rates lower (Panel C), reducing U’s borrowing costs.
Figure 6 presents the results of a simulation similar to Figure 4.33 Panel E demonstrates that the real
exchange rate appreciates on impact by 9.5 percent, then depreciates slowly, returning to λ0− in 12 years,
then depreciating by another 1.6 percent. Given the previous discussion, the long run depreciation of the real
exchange rate implies that the asymptotic current account deﬁcits are (slightly) larger than in the single good
32The rebalancing channel refers to the mechanism whereby the rapid accumulation of claims on U by R residents, together
with the consumption home bias assumption requires a future a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
33To generate ﬁgure 6, we need to calibrate the elasticity of substitution σ and the preference for the home good γ. Feenstra
(1994) ﬁnds a value of 4 for σ while Broda and Weinstein (2006) report estimates ranging from 17 at 7-digit between 1972-1988
to 4 for 3-digit goods in 1990-2001. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) use an elasticity of 2 while Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) used
a value of 6. We adopt a value of σ = 4. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) use a weight on domestic tradeable of 0.7. But they
also assume a share of expenditure on non-tradeable equal to 0.75. This corresponds to a share of domestic consumption on
domestic goods γ of 0.925, not far from our 0.9.
30Figure 6: A Collapse in δR in the two-good model
model (-1.56 percent versus -1.47 percent in the single good model) with a correspondingly higher permanent
accumulation of net foreign liabilities (49% of output versus 48%). Panel C shows that our conclusion with
respect to the decline in interest rates from the single good model remains largely unchanged.
6 Final Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a framework to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent structural shocks on global
capital ﬂows, portfolio shares and interest rates. The framework highlights the central role played by the
heterogeneity in countries’ ability to produce ﬁnancial assets for global savers.
We used the framework to discuss diﬀerent ﬁnancial shocks and trends that we view as particularly
relevant in explaining recent “global imbalances” and the “interest rate conundrum.” These include the
31collapse in asset markets in Japan in the early 1990s, the emerging market crash in the late 1990s, as well as
secular process of global integration and fast growth by China and other emerging markets. All these eﬀects
point in the same direction: To a sustained reallocation of savings toward U and to lower interest rates.
The framework is ﬂexible enough to explore a variety of experiments and issues that have been postulated
in the “global imbalances” debate. For example, in an earlier version of this paper (Caballero et al. (2006b)),
we showed how the growth gap that developed between the US and Continental Europe during the 1990s
generates patterns in our model which are consistent with the data. One could also model some of the
aspects of ﬁscal deﬁcits in the US as an increase in θU. This would indeed lead to current account deﬁcits
in U but it would increase rather than reduce interest rates, and hence it is probably not the main factor
behind current “global imbalances.” Instead, this angle oﬀers a better representation of the current account
deﬁcits of the US during the 1980s.
Before concluding, it is important to emphasize that broadly interpreted our framework is one of current
account rather than one of consumption determination. While we chose to explain the basic mechanism in
terms of a simple consumption decision, it should be apparent from the investment extension that the channels
through which ﬁnancial underdevelopment and crashes aﬀect the current account are multiple. Similarly, our
framework is ﬂexible enough to accommodate several speciﬁc channels through which ﬁnancial development
heterogeneity inﬂuences “global imbalances.” For example, recently Mendoza et al. (2007) describe an U-R
mechanism that can be interpreted within our framework. Their paper shows how global imbalances can
arise between countries that have achieved diﬀerent level of development of risk sharing markets. Their
analysis primarily emphasizes long term trends due to gradual ﬁnancial integration and heterogeneity in risk
sharing, which can be captured by a low θR in our setup; a “savings glut” story. This is consistent with the
trend stories we highlight, but it is not a suﬃcient story for the sharp turnaround in global ﬂows during the
period we describe. While both mechanisms are intertwined and probably were at play during the Asian and
Russian crisis of 1997-1999, it seems reasonable to argue that a signiﬁcant part of the decline in consumption
and investment came directly from the sharp decline in the value of domestic assets. Otherwise, if only a
low θR was at play, while the interest rate and current accounts would have exhibited the observed patterns,
Asian asset prices would have risen rather than declined during that episode.
Finally, a word of caution. Our framework also highlights that the current conﬁguration of global asym-
metries is likely to continue building the already large net external liabilities of U. Leverage always comes
with risks. A substantial growth speed up in Europe and Japan, or a sudden shift in R’s appetite for its
own ﬁnancial assets (as could happen with the emergence of local bubbles), would lead to a sharp reversal in
capital ﬂows, interest rates and exchange rates. One could also go outside the model and add a credit-risk
concern with U’s liabilities to generate a more harmful reversal. Our model has little to say about the
latter possibility, although it seems remote. Moreover, one of our main points has been that such risk does
not follow as an unavoidable outcome of the current conﬁguration in global imbalances, as the latter are
consistent with global asymmetries in ﬁnancial development and needs.
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34A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We have
Vt =
  ∞
t
δXse−
R s
t rududs = δXt
  ∞
t
e−
R s
t (ru−g)duds
Wt = W0e
R t
0 (rs−θ)ds +
  t
0
(1 − δ)Xse
R t
s (ru−θ)duds
= (1 − δ)Xt
 
W0
(1 − δ)Xt
e
R t
0 (rs−θ)ds +
  t
0
e
R t
s (ru−θ−g)duds
 
The Lemma follows from the fact that
lim
t→∞
  ∞
t
e−
R s
t (ru−g)duds =
1
r − g
lim
t→∞
  t
0
e
R t
s (ru−θ−g)duds =
1
g + θ − r
and
lim
t→∞
W0
(1 − δ)Xt
e
R t
0 (rs−θ)ds = 0
when g < r < g + θ.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
The ﬁrst inequality of the ﬁrst statement follows directly from (δ−δR) > 0, as in Proposition 2. The second
inequality follows from the fact that xU
t declines over time. Asymptotically, rt converges to rR
aut.
From Lemma 1, we know that
CAU
t
XU
t
→
t → ∞
gR > g
−g
rU
aut − rR
aut  
g + θ − rR
aut
  
rR
aut − g
  < 0
On the other hand, from Proposition 1 we have that
CAU
t
XU
t
→
t → ∞
gR = g
−g
rU
aut − r+
(g + θ − r+)(r+ − g)
< 0
where r+ = rU
aut − θ
 
1 − xU
0
 
(δ − δR) (see (16)). From assumption 4, r+ > rR
aut and the second statement
in the proposition now follows since
r − rU
aut
(g + θ − r)(r − g)
=
1 − δ
g + θ − r
−
δ
r − g
is increasing with respect to r.
35A.3 Proof of equation (18)
The wealth accumulation and asset pricing equations are
˙ W i
t = rtW i
t + (1 − δ)Xi
t − θiW i
t (28)
and
rtV
i
t = δX
i
t + ˙ V
i
t (29)
These dynamics can be integrated to
˙ Wt = rtWt + (1 − δ)Xt −
 
i
θiW i
t
rtVt = δXt + ˙ Vt
Equilibrium requires that Vt = Wt so that
Xt =
 
i
θiW i
t (30)
and the world interest rate is given by
rt =
˙ Wt
Wt
+ δ
Xt
Wt
.
Deriving (30) with respect to time and substituting in the budget constraint, we get:
˙ Xt =
 
i
θi ˙ W i
t =
 
i
θi  
rtW i
t +
 
1 − δi 
Xi
t − θiW i
t
 
= rtXt +
 
i
θi  
1 − δi 
Xi
t −
 
i
θi2W i
t
Hence
rt = g −
 
i
θ
i  
1 − δ
i  Xi
t
Xt
+
 
i
θ
i2W i
t
Xt
=
 
i
xi
tri +
 
i
θi  
θiW i
t/Xi
t − 1
 
xi
t
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
Let us ﬁrst focus on the ﬁrst claim in the proposition. In situation 1, we have
˙ Wt =
 
1 − κxU
t
  ˙ Xt
θ
− κ˙ xU
t
Xt
θ
=
Xt
θ
 
gnxU
t + gz − κxU
t g
 
36Substituting into the asset equation we solve for the interest rate:
rt = gz +
θ¯ δt
1 − κxU
t
+
gnxU
t
1 − κxU
t
 
1 − κ − θ
V U
t
XU
t
 
where ¯ δt = δxU
t + δRxR
t . Comparing the interest rate at time 0 when there is no investment collapse (r0 =
gz + θ¯ δ0/(1 − κ)) and where there is an investment collapse, the diﬀerence in interest rates is
∆r0 = −κθ¯ δ0
1 − xU
0  
1 − κxU
0
 
(1 − κ)
+
gnxU
0
1 − κxU
0
 
1 − κ − θ
V U
0
XU
0
 
and this is negative because each term is negative (since U is a borrower, we know that κXU
0 + θW U
0 =
IU
0 + CU
0 > XU
t ). This proves the ﬁrst claim in the proposition.
Let us now prove the second claim in the proposition. To distinguish variables under our counterfactual
situation 2, we adopt the convention to underline those variables. We have
V0+ = (1 − κ
XU
0
X0
)
X0
θ
and
V R
0+ =
δRXR
0
δRXR
0 + δXU
0
V0+.
Similarly
V 0+ = (1 − κ)
X0
θ
= V0+ − κ
XR
t
θ
and
V
R
0+ =
δRXR
0
δRXR
0 + δXU
0
V 0+.
Hence
V R
0+ − V
R
0+ =
δRXR
0
δRXR
0 + δXU
0
(V 0+ − V0+) =
δRXR
0
δRXR
0 + δXU
0
κ
XR
0
θ
=
V R
0+
V0+
κ
XR
0
θ
Let us ﬁrst consider situation 1. Assuming extreme home bias, at t = 0+, we have,
TBU
0+ = CAU
0+ = θW R
0+ − XR
0 = θV R
0+ − XR
0
Let us now analyze situation 2.
TB
U
0+ = CA
U
0+ = θW
R
0+ − (1 − κ)XR
0 = θV
R
0+ − (1 − κ)XR
0
= θ(V R
0+ − κ
XR
0
θ
V R
0+
V0+
) − (1 − κ)XR
0
= θV
R
0+ − X
R
0 (1 − κ(1 −
V R
0+
V0+
))
Hence
CAU
0+ < CA
U
0+
and
TBU
0+ < TB
U
0+
This proves the second claim in the proposition.
37A.5 Proof of proposition 5
Let us assume that enough time has passed so that the output of the old R trees is negligible relative to the
total output produced by trees planted in R by U. We have:
(rt + gn)V i
t = δUXi
t + ˙ V i
t
(rt + g
n)Vt = δ
UXt + ˙ Vt
˙ W U
t = (rt − θ)W U
t + (1 − δU)XU
t + gnVt − (IU
t + IR
t ) − Pt.
˙ W R
t = (rt − θ)W R
t + (1 − δU)XR
t + Pt.
˙ Wt = (rt − θ)Wt + (1 − δU)Xt + gnVt − It (31)
so that:
Wt = Vt = (1 − κ)
Xt
θ
.
and
r = rU
aut = gz +
δθ
1 − κ
(32)
It follows from derivations analogous to those in previous sections that:
W U
t
XU
t
→
(1 − δU − κ) + gn δ
U
rU
aut−gz + gn δ
Ux
R/x
U
rU
aut−gz − (κ + κP)xR/xU
θ + g − rU
aut
and since TBU
t = −θW U
t − IU
t + XU
t , we have that:
TBU
t
XU
t
→ −θ
(1 − δU − κ) + gn δ
U
rU
aut−gz + gn δ
Ux
R/x
U
rU
aut−gz − (κ + κP)xR/xU
θ + g − rU,aut + (1 − κ)
= −θ
xR
xU
gn δ
U
rU
aut−gz − (κ + κP)
θ + g − rU
aut
< 0.
That is, the trade balance is in deﬁcit in the long run as long as there is an intermediation rent, which is
ensured by Assumption 6.
A.6 Derivation of the dynamics in section 4.2
Deﬁne vRo
t the value of an old R tree, vRn
t the value of a new R tree and vU
t the value of a U tree. The asset
equation for each tree follows (note that the capitalized share of output for old R trees is δR).
rtvRo
t = δRZR
t + ˙ vRo
t
rtvRn
t = δZR
t + ˙ vRn
t
rtvU
t = δZU
t + ˙ vU
t
38The aggregate value of U trees is V U
t = NU
t vU
t and satisﬁes
rtV U
t = δXU
t + ˙ V U
t − gnV U
t
The aggregate value of new trees in R is V Rn
t =
 
NR
t − NR
0
 
vRn
t and satisﬁes
rtV Rn
t = δ
 
NR
t − NR
0
 
ZR
t +
 
NR
t − NR
0
 
˙ vRn
t
= δX
Rn
t + ˙ V
Rn
t − g
nN
R
t v
Rn
t
Finally, deﬁne the aggregate value of the old trees in R as V Ro
t = NR
0 vRo
t . It satisﬁes:
rtV Ro
t = δRXRo
t + ˙ V Ro
t
Aggregate wealth then evolves according to
rtVt = δ
 
XU
t + XRn
t
 
+ δRXRo
t + ˙ Vt − gnV U
t − gnNR
t vRn
t
Let’s now consider the wealth accumulation equations:
˙ W U
t = (rt − θ)W U
t + (1 − δ)XU
t + gnV U
t + gnNR
t vRn
t − Pt − It
˙ W
R
t = (rt − θ)W
R
t + (1 − δ)X
Rn
t +
 
1 − δ
R 
X
Ro
t + Pt
Aggregating, we obtain:
˙ Wt = (rt − θ)Wt + (1 − δ)
 
XU
t + XRn
t
 
+
 
1 − δR 
XRo
t + gnV U
t + gnNR
t vRn
t − It
In equilibrium, W = V from which we infer:
θWt = Xt (1 − κ)
and the interest rate satisﬁes:
rt =
˙ Xt
Xt
+ θ
 
δ
 
xU
t + xRn
t
 
+ δRxRo
t
 
/(1 − κ) −
θ
1 − κ
gnV U
t + NR
t vRn
t
Xt
=
˙ Xt
Xt
− g
n + θ
 
δ
 
x
U
t + x
Rn
t
 
+ δ
Rx
Ro
t
 
/(1 − κ) −
θ
1 − κ
g
nNR
0
 
vRn
t − vRo
t
 
Xt
while aggregate output growth satisﬁes:
˙ Xt
Xt
= gn + gz
substituting output growth ˙ Xt/Xt = gn +gz, and using vRo
t /vRn
t = δR/δ, and deﬁning ˆ v
R0
t = V
R0
t /X
R0
t , we
obtain:
rt = gz + θ
 
δ
 
xU
t + xRn
t
 
+ δRxRo
t
 
/(1 − κ) −
θ
1 − κ
gnˆ vRo
t x
R0
t
 
δ/δR − 1
 
The last term makes clear that the interest rate will initially be lower with FDI since δ/δR > 1. The reason
is that gn  
V U + NR
t vRn
t
 
> gnVt so the asset demand in U increases more when there is FDI. This depresses
even more interest rates.
39Asymptotically, the last term disappears (since vRn
t and vRo
t grow at rate gz while X grows at rate
g > gz) and xRo
t tends to 0, so that
r∞ = gz +
θδ
1 − κ
= raut
Since vRn
t > vRo
t and δRxRo
t ≤ δxRo
t , we have:
rt ≤ r∞
To solve this problem, note that ˆ vRo
t satisﬁes:
dˆ vRo
t
dt
= (rt − g
z) ˆ v
Ro
t − δ
R
while xRo
t follows simple dynamics:
˙ xRo
t = −gnxRo
t
Substituting, we obtain a single equation for dˆ vRo
t /dt with a forcing term xRo
t :
dˆ vRo
t
dt
=
θ
1 − κ
 
δ
 
1 − x
Ro
t
 
+ δ
Rx
Ro
t − g
nˆ v
Ro
t x
Ro
t
 
δ/δ
R − 1
  
ˆ v
Ro
t − δ
R
We can solve this diﬀerential equation by ‘reversing time’. Since rt → raut, ˆ vRo
t settles to:
ˆ vRo
∞ =
δR
δ
1
θ
We start at t = ∞ with xRo very close to 0 and ˆ vRo = ˆ vRo
∞ then move ‘back’ in time until xRo = xRo
0 .
Finally, after we ﬁnd the value of ˆ v
R0
0+, we integrate forward the budget constraint using wU
t = W U
t /XU
t
and
˙ wU
t =
(rt − θ)W U
t + (1 − δ)XU
t + gnV U
t + gnNR
t vRn
t − Pt − It
XU
t
− gwU
t
= (rt − θ − g)wU
t +
 
1 − δ −
κ
xU
t
 
+ gn
 
1 − κ
θ
1
xU
t
− ˆ vRo
t
xRo
t
xU
t
 
1 −
δ
δR
 
− κp
xRn
t
xU
t
 
A.7 Solving the Model with Exchange Rates
We use a shooting algorithm to solve for the initial terms of trade qi
0+ and asset values V i
0+ after the shock.
Deﬁne wt = W U
t /XU
t and xt = XU
t /
 
i qi
tXi
t. The system (wt,xt,qi
t) satisﬁes:
˙ wt = (rt − θ − g)wt + (1 − δ) (33)
1 = θγwtP
U(σ−1)
t + (1 − γ)
 
1
xt
− θwt
 
P
i(σ−1)
t (34)
˙ xt = xt (1 − xt)
 
g − g
i −
˙ qi
t
qi
t
 
(35)
rt = xt (g + δθ) + (1 − xt)
 
gi +
˙ qi
t
qi
t
+ δiθ
 
(36)
Equation (33) is the wealth dynamics for country i. Equation (34) is the equilibrium condition on the market
for good U. Equation (35)characterizes the law of motion of relative output. Unlike the one-good model,
40the path for future interest rates depends upon the future sequence of terms of trade, which depends upon
the current and future asset values.
We start with a guess for the asset values V i
0+ immediately after the shock. Given the initial portfolio
allocation, we infer the initial wealth distribution W i
0+. We then use (34) to solve for the initial terms of
trade q0+. Finally, we integrate (33)-(36) forward to construct the path of future interest rates and terms of
trade rt,qt consistent with equilibrium on the goods markets. We then use
V
i
0+ = δ
i
  ∞
0
q
i
tX
i
te
−
R s
0 rududs
= qi
0Xi
0δi
  ∞
0
e−θ
R s
0
¯ δuduxi
s
xi
0
ds
to update our guess for V i
0+, where ¯ δt =
 
i xi
tδi is the average (time-varying) capitalization ratio.
41